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YUGOSLAVIA, THE NON-GROWTH SYNDROME, AND




The purpose of this concept is three-fold, viz.:
first, to point to the most pressing
socioeconomic and political problems of
Yugoslavia; second, to emphasize the
incapability within the existing institutional
arrangements to undertake the otherwise
needed institutional reforms; and third, to
sketch a new approach that might be
supportive to the overall transformation of
society and its emancipation from the past and
existing practices. The attention is focused to
one of the key segments of the so-called
'societal guidance/governance cluster', i.e.,
development planning policy, although a
number of general issues of societal mana-
gement and control are also tackled.
BRIEF NOTE ON THE EXISTING
SOCIOECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
CIRCUMSTANCES
In almost each and every respect, Yugoslav
society has been in a deep social, economic
and political crisis for more than a decade
now. In general terms, the existing situation
has resulted from an interplay of number of
factors, broadly grouped into three sets: (i) An
inappropriate reaction of Yugoslav political and
economic elites to the collapse of socia-
lism/communism and its regional repercus-
sions. (ii) Poor domestic macroeconomic poll-
cies almost throughout the 1990s. (iii) Often
dysfunctional policies of the international
community with regard to the key problems in
the Balkans, most notably manifested in the
case of international sanctions towards FRY,
and well as in occasional support to the most
destructive actors in Yugoslavia and in some
other countries in the region.
In asense, as from the beginning of the 1990s
the population ofYugoslavia has been exposed
to an apart anthropological experiment in vivo,
via a number of rnis-events, viz.: huge human
losses; breakdown of the SFRY; war; interna-
tional sanctions; pauperisation, deprivation and
austerity for the large majority of the popu-
lation; organised crime; extremely high level of
corruption in all strands of the society; NATO
air strikes in the spring of 1999 (being, in
effect, a 'dirty war' against the population, and
in favour of the regime); people disempowered
vis-a-vls an authoritarian regime, now heading
for an open dictatorship; etc.
Some key characteristics of the existing
situation read as follows:
(i) Extremely high rate of unemployment,
effectively around 50% (despite a large number
ofpeople employed in the shadow economy, in
recent years reaching up to 40% of the total
GOP).
(ii) Sharp decline of absolute and relative GOP
over the recent decade, e.g., GOP p.c. not
exceeding 1200 USD in 1999, which isamark
well below 1/2 of that from the end of 1980s.
(iii) Total foreign debt of USD 12.25 billion,
i.e., 96% of the GOP (1999).
(iv) Obsolete structure of a large part of the
economy, in technological, market, and other
terms.
(v) Up to one million refugees into the FRY.
(vi) Devastating 'brain drain' in the 1990s,
estimated at few hundred thousand people,
mostly young, vital, well educated and
dynamic.
(vii) All key health, education, social care and
demographic indicators worsened.
(viii) Extreme social polarisation: pauperisation
of the majority of population (the poor: 2/3 of
the total); and social, economic and political
rise of the nouveau riche (the rich or extremely
rich: 3-5% of the total).
(ix) Deep crisis of public finances: a dearth in
public revenues, unfavourable structure of
public expenditures, etc.
(x) Spatial (regional, territorial. ..) distribution
of development worsened.
(xi) Disproportionally high level of spatio-
ecological pollution and degradation - as
compared with the reached level of
socioeconomic development.
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(xii) Poor condition of all technical
lntraslrucfure (as aconsequence of low level of
investments in the 1990s).
(xiii) Low level and unfavourable structure or
public and private investments in the 1990s.
(xiv) Dearth of foreign financial and other
resources for domestic development purposes.
In effect, despite the existing legal provisions,
social, economic and political reforms have
been suspended for a number of years now.
The steps which have so far been undertaken to
that end, do not satisfy the relevant criteria. In
sum, only rudimentary 'retouches' have been
done, thereby withholding the changes at the
'proto' level only, which applies to all key
sectors, i.e., privatisation, marketisation, and
political pluralisation/democratisation.
The recent NATO air strikes have only added to
the otherwise miserable conditions, thus cau-
sing a number of direct and indirect material
damages and ecological disasters, as well as
many 'collateral damages', viz.:
(i) Part of comparative advantages and
development chances lost.
(ii) Further loss of democracy.
(iii) Chauvinism and nationalism strengthened.
(iv) Xenophobia and anti-European stance
increased.
(v) Public domain narrowed.
(vi) Increased manipulation, most notably in
the case of the existing non-growth syndrome
versus the official pro-growth rhetoric and
booster imagery.
(viii) Repression increased.
(lx) Maneuvering space for the transition
reforms narrowed, making the restructuring
more expensive and difficult.
(x) 'Warfare state' still not dismantled - policing
and militarisation of the society strengthened.
(xi) Cultural and historical identity of the
society well undermined.
(xii) All-pervasive apathy among the majority of
social strata.
ACRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
POLICY
Despite nominal reforms of the institutional
settings which have been undertaken in the
1990s in the sphere of development planning
policy, this segment cannot be deemed
appropriately reformed. In effect, there has
been adeep crisis in this field as well, caused
by many factors. The key factors of the kind
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stem from the existing political power
structure, which manifests itself in a specific
way in the realm of development planning
policy. Another key aspect has to do with the
problem of a number of public interests lost.
Finally, many of planning powers stem from
the state, and, consequently, the state's role(s)
disputed also implies the planning's role(s)
disputed. The problems in question could be
recognised at various levels, namely, at
theoretical, heuristic, and practical.
At the theoretical level, the existing
development planning policy practice could be
approximated by means of a number of the
theoretical modes known. In effect, specific
elements from all key planning policy doctri-
nes could be recognised (yet without aproper
rectitude ofrespective genuine concepts), viz.:
(i) Libertarian planning dominates the political
and expert scene, as aspecific manifestation of
the wide-spread anti-planning/constructivism
stance (being preached primarily by the main-
stream economists, either of the neoliberal
provenience, or ofthe neoinstitutional one).
(ii) Many scraps from traditional theoretical
paradigms are also being 'recycled', though in
a strange way, vlz.: social reform, policy
analysis and related doctrines (rationalist,
comprehensive/synoptic, incrementalist, stra-
tegic/developmental,implementation-oriented,
etc.), social learning/transactive, progres-
sive/advocacy, negotiative, radical, etc.
(iii) There has also been a number of newly
emerging paradigms, notably, sustainable de-
velopment, communicative/collaborative plan-
ning, and ecological/environmental planning.
At the heuristic level, as from the end of the
1980s the planning policy authorities seem to
have been practising two dominant modes,
although one more has also been tried
occasionally, at least in nominal terms, viz.:
(i) What dominates 'on the surface' may be
described as 'crisis management planning',
which equals 'making the ends meet', implying
that a number of key long term issues have
been grossly neglected by that means.
(ii) In social, economic and political terms, the
existing institutional arrangements in the
development planning policy realm seem to
have been usurped and instrumentalised as a
support to 'wild' privatisation and 'proto'
marketisation, thereby acting as the key
redistribution mechanism to the benefit of the
newly emerging interest groups who profit
most under such 'imperfect' circumstances.
(iii) Only in statu nascendi is now the third
mode, i.e., a veritably transformative planning,
otherwise the most necessitated from the
standpoint of the long term needs.
As from the beginning of 1990s, the former
'p(l)andemonium' of selfmanagement planning
(a fairly decentralised model, as compared to
the other 'p(l)andemonium of the GOSPLAN-
like model ofplanning that used to dominate in
other socialisVcommunist countries) has been
abandoned. Particularly, the system of socio-
economic planning was dismantled and
consequent practice collapsed, not to be
substituted as yet by a new planning practice
of the 'market' era. Now, one may easily reco-
gnise a somewhat 'eclectic' approach. Namely,
at the practical level, some few hundred
various plans or related development policy
documents (macroeconomic policy docu-
ments, socioeconomic development plans,
urban development plans, spatial plans, envi-
ronmental policy documents, specific sectoral
programmes and projects) that have been
prepared in Yugoslavia in the 1990s seem to
prove awide accepted notion that the majority
of such documents may well serve many va-
rious missions, though legitimate, other than
the development planning policy documents
'proper' use to do, viz.:
(i) Back-covering for private appropriation of
public goods.
(ii) 'Something isbeing done'.
(iii) Countering criticisms.
(iv) Establishing 'mere' development planning
policy information support.
(v) 'Mere' monitoring ofchanges.
(vi) Plans/policies as catalysts/generators of
ideas.
(vii) Plans/policies as bargaining devices.
(viii) Arena for debate - defining the problem
agenda and acommon understanding thereof.
(ix) Putting the things above the board -
legalising previously illegal or illegitimate
undertakings.
(x) Least noticeable are those development
documents which fulfill a definition of the
planning activity sui generis, i.e., as an activity
in the public domain, aimed at an organised
way of resolving some non-standard problem,
via a strategy for whose implementation
towards a selected number of agreed-upon
aims/goals/objectives/targets, political support
as well as other resources needed are
available...
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THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM:
INAPPROPRIATE POWER STRUCTURE FOR
THE CASE OF ATRANSFORMATION OF THE
SOCIETY
Both as a legacy of the former 'lueoloolcal and
political system (i), and as a result of the
events in the first phase of the transition period
(ii), the power structure that underlies the
planning practice isgrossly inappropriate from
the standpoint of the mid and long term goals
of the post-communisVsocialist transformation
of society. Specifically in planning, it assumes
only one of the facets mirroring the power
structure pattern which dominates the entire
political scene.
A general pattern of the so-called 're-
active/coercive' power ('power over') dominates
in the society at large. In many respects, this
pattern isnot compatible with the development
of a democratic/pluralist, and predominantly
market- and private property-based society. Its
specific manifestations are:
(i) Use of force (though more psychic than
physical).
(ii) The prevalence of 'poor' forms of authority
(i.e., coercive authority, false authority, etc.).
(iii) All-pervasive manipulation on the part of
the regime, as well as on the part of some
other political actors.
(iv) Widely practised paternalism and clien-
telism in the (re)distribution of practically all
scarce resources.
In addition to these, there has also been awide-
spread disregard of the law, practised at large by
many organisations,Jnstitutions and citizens.
A strong departure is needed towards those
power structure arrangements which would be
more supportive to the overall democratic
transformation of the society. Consequently,
new planning approaches are also needed, that
would be capable of supporting such trends,
by means of some other power relations. In
general, more of the so-called 'co/pro-active'
power ('power over') is needed, broadly based
on cooperation, partnership, compromise, and
consensus. Particular forms of power relations
are needed here, viz.:
(i) The use of persuasion as adominant pattern
is of a decisive importance for the success of
new modernising societal projects in each and
every field of societal life.
(ii) 'Good' forms of authority (e.g., legitimate
authority, authority of competence and profes-
sional expertise, personal authority, etc.) are
also expected to be helpful to that end.
(iii) Physical force would be acceptable only in
those cases when the undisputed public
interests and private property cannot be
protected by means of other measures.
(iv) Consequently, a new balance should be
sought for in the 'triangle' power - knowledge -
(planning) action. In general, knowledge base
in development planning policy should be
broadened and improved, by introducing more
of the 'layman' knowledge, as well as by
appropriately combining it with the 'scientific'
knowledge of experts.
(v) Anew dialogue should be introduced among
various experts, and the fora/arenas for that sake
established, and the now predominant
extremisms/escapisms removed, viz.: econo-
mism in socioeconomic planning policy (gros-
sly practised by economist in the first place);
physicalism in spatial and urban planning
(architects and physico-geographers leading the
way in the field); and ecologism in environ-
mental policy and planning (widely applied by
ecologists, biologists, 'general environmen-
talists', and many other natural scientists).
THE PROBLEM OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN
DEVELOPMENT POLICY/PLANNING
Another key source of delegitimisation of
development planning_policy has to do with the
notion ofpublic lnterest in planning policy, an
otherwise often ill-defined concept, i.e., for an
'unspecified' client. In a sense, this represents
a legacy of the former political and ideological
system, within which the so-called 'social
ownership', the key legitimisation base of
('socialist') public interests, took supremacy
over all other forms of property. Whatever the
general case, however, almost all former
socialisVcommunist public interests have
obviously collapsed at the very beginning of
the new era, thereby disturbing broader social,
political and economic legitimising base of
planning policy, as well as its ethical
foundations and value background. At the same
time, an enormous number of new legitimate
individual interest came to the surface (some
of which were previously hidden for various,
mostly political and ideological reasons), and
many of them have been competing for the
status of new pubic interest(s). Thus, the basis
dilemma appeared, as to which interests do
really represent public purposes, condensed in
the key question: partial or general? Concer-
ning this, one may well notice that the 'fight' is
not over whatsoever, and that 'public interests'
appear under many various names, e.g.:
(i) As 'general public opinion'.
(ii) As a 'sum' of the most numerous interests
at some point of time.
(iii) As an amorphous 'bundle' of current
particular compromises.
(iv) As the interests of the most vociferous
and/or powerful and/or 'would-be-winners'.
(v) As veritable interests of the overwhelming
majority of actors, acceptable to 'all'.
(vi) As potential interests of the disa-
dvantaged/disempowered/deprived (now pre-
vailingly apathetic and dormant public).
THE STATE'S ROLE(S) DISPUTED
At the beginning of the transition period in
Yugoslavia, many hopes were laid down into a
new state. No doubt, the socialisVcommunist
state was seen to be dismantled, and, in the
wake of overall deregulation, more market-
based decisions were sought for. At the same
time and for obvious reasons, however, there
was a strong conviction among many experts
and politician about an urge to also develop
appropriate institutional arrangements to
approximate a 'post-communisVsocialist wel-
fare state', at least as an 'asymptotic ideal' to
tend to. Contrary to such early expectations,
ten years later, under the circumstances of a
deep overall crisis, people face many problems
concerning the existing, an eminently pre-
modern and authoritarian state. In effect, such
an institutional 'entity' represents an apart and
retrogressed assemblage of disparate elements
from various historical models known, viz.:
(i)The public goods state.
(ii)The macroeconomic stabilisation state.
(iii) The development state.
(iv) The social rights state.
(v) The socialisVcommunist state.
(vi) The state of early/initial post-comma-
nisVsocialist 'capitalist accumulation'.
(vii) The 'warfare state'.
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS· Summary of
the shortcomings and constraints of the
existing planning/policy system and
practice, and an outline ofa new
planning policy concept
In short, the shortcomings and constraints of
the existing planning/policy system and
practice could be summarised as follows:
(i) Lack of sound theoretical and general
methodological background.
(ii) Suspended reforms of the institutional
settings.
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(iii) Wide-spread anti-planning stance: econo-
mism/liberalism, physicalism and ecologisrn.
(iv) Poor coalitions for the planning/policy
case and the collapse of the former public inte-
rests: legimisation, role(s) and mission lost.
(v) Mis-direction: support for 'wild' priva-
tisation and marketisation, counter to the needs
of averitable transformation.
(vi) Effective collapse of socioeconomic plan-
ning (esp. at the regional/local levels), and no
substitution sightable.
(vii) Poor coordination between socioeconomic
planning/policy, spatial/urban planning, and
environmental policy.
(viii) Undeveloped implementation devices.
(ix) Insufficient knowledge/information base on
the existing circumstances (esp. on the absorp-
tive spatio-ecological capacity and thresholds).
(x) Poor knowledge on development options,
and anon-rigour in their ex ante evaluation.
(xi) Rudimentarily developed methodology of
planning/policy in aplural society.
(xii) Inadequate education for planning/policy
in aplural society.
(xiii) Over-centralisation of the planning/policy
system.
(xix) Weak democratic strands of the planning
practice in terms of its openness, transparency
and participation/partnership.
(xx) Inadequate power structure relations in
development planning and policy.
(xxi) Unclear role of the state in the post-
communisVsocialist planning/policy, and its
weak support for the institutional reform of
development planning and policy.
Apparently, a general theory of democratic
development planning policy is not possible.
This is the very reason for which attention is
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directed here to the level of heuristics of
planning policy. Namely, it is this level which
could appropriately 'bridge' the gap between
abstract theoretical notions on planning, on the
one hand, and some practical approaches, on
the other. Now, talking planning is not 'in'
among the majority of experts in Yugoslavia.
Yet, a belief could strongly be supported that
the theme of planning policy is likely to come
to the political and expert agenda in the nearest
future. This seems obvious as the supreme
political and expert mantras of transition
('privatisation', 'marketlsatlorr, 'privatisation',
'de-planification', 'spontaneity', 'deregula-
tion'tde-etatisation', etc.) are being more
frequently abandoned in their early andover-
simplified ('pure'tperfect') forms now. To that
end, a new 'societal contract' on planning
policy is needed, as well as anumber of steps
to support the dialogue on the key issues, viz.:
(i) Fora/arenas for dialogue.
(ii)Agenda-setting.
(iii) Mission and role of development planning
policy, relative ·to other key mechanisms (i.e.,
market, various general and sectoral policies,
state regulations, societal norms, etc.).
(iv) Broad societal consensus on the key
development goals and available and accepta-
ble implementation devices.
(v) 'Coalitions and networks for development
planning policy' - societal actors who are
interested in the matter to be located (as there
is no 'general' need for planning among
different social strata, let alone the mere fact
that even many planners 'quit lobbying for the
case ofplanning').
A tentative framework and concept for a new
('post-communisVsocialist') planning is also
sketched here, comprising a number of
heuristic principles and criteria for such
planning policy to satisfy, as follows:
(i) Supporting political democracy and
complex societal transformation, modernisa-
tion and emancipation.




(iv) Problem-oriented and selective, focused to
the: 'plannable', 'restricted planning domain',
'regulated/planned deregulation'...
(v) Sustainable spatial and urban development
centred, with a number of pertinent socioeco-
nomic development and environmental protec-
tion issues subsumed under the umbrella of
the former.
(vi) More rigorous in terms of planning
evaluation: combining ex ante, ex post and ex
continuo approaches.
(vii) Implementation-oriented: harnessing all
implementation devices available, for the
problem agenda and objectives agreed-upon.
(viii) Open, transparent and participative.
(ix) As much as possible partnership-, com-
promise- and consensus-based.
(x) Fairly decentralised, yet with a number of
centralised powers maintained, so that the
transition reforms could be properly under-
taken, directed, programmed, and managed.
(xi) Balanced: 'sociocratic'-and-'technocratic',
expertise and 'layman' knowledge combined,
etc.
(xii) Plans+ programmes+ projects: pertinent
programmes and projects, as the key
implementation devices and support, to be
subsumed under the strategic planning policy
schemes and frameworks.
